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Abstract—Physical layer security is essential in optical net-
works. In this paper, we study a jamming-aware control plane,
in which a high power jamming attack exists in the network. The
studied control plane considers that the jammed connections can
be detected and avoided. We used a physical layer model, in
which we embedded the additional jamming power, to evaluate
different security in scenarios, such as a jamming-free scenario,
jamming with an unaware controller, and jamming with an aware
controller. The performance is analyzed in terms of the blocking
rate and slots utilization. We analyze the impact of jamming
attacks in the least used link and in the most used link on the
network. The results demonstrates that the jamming avoidance
by the control plane can reach performance near the not jammed
scenario.
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of new applications with high bandwidth
demand and new access technologies pushes the telecommu-
nications industry to seek new solutions to attend the growing
need for bandwidth [1]. Elastic optical networks (EON) appear
in this context as an infrastructure candidate to accomplish
the requirement for higher transmission rates [2]. The EON
links present channels called slots, with the spectral granularity
of 12.5 GHz. The spectral slots can be grouped and create
larger channels to provide higher transmission rates to greater
bandwidth. The data transmission in the optical environment,
the establishment of circuits in parallel on the same link
and the flexibility to create channels that can settle higher
bandwidth circuits are important characteristics of EONs that
increase the transmission capacity [3].
To enable the use of EON in the real world, it is convenient
to ensure a high level of security on the network. In general,
EON can be the target of several types of attacks [4]. One
particular type of attack is performed by inserting a high
power signal in a spectral frequency range within the optical
fiber. This power addition is called jamming attack and leads
to the reduction of the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for the
active circuits. As a consequence of the SNR reduction, the
circuits may reach SNR rates below a defined SNR threshold
(SNRTH ), which impairs the quality of transmission (QoT) of
the network and can cause financial loss for network operators,
by the breach of guarantees defined in the Service Level
Agreement (SLA).
Jamming attacks can be classified into two types [5]. Figure
1 shows an optical link between two nodes, under a jamming
attack. The first type is in-band jamming, and represents the
insertion of high power within a spectral window (slots 5, 6
and 7 in Fig. 1). The slots inside the affected range undergo
an increase in power, which directly impacts their SNR level
(circuits in slots 5 and 7 in Fig. 1). The second type of
attack, out-of-band jamming, is a side-effect of the interference
provided by the power of jammed circuits in the other circuits
of the network (in slots 3 and 8). The out-of-band intensity
is stronger in the slots near the spectral range under attack.
Thus, the jamming affects circuits in the attacked slot range
and also circuits outside the attack area.
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Fig. 1. In-band and out-of-band jamming demonstration.
The study of physical interference requires a model to
measure the impact of the physical transmission environment
on the quality of network circuits. Most papers focuses on
the proposition of solutions and models for detecting jamming
attacks [6]–[8] or protecting the network against its occurrence
[9]–[12]. However, it is important to analyze the non-linearity
effects added by the insertion of a high power signal. The
authors in [13] propose a model for calculating the quality of
the circuits, using their respective SNR. The power of jamming
attack can be added in the SNR model, and the proposal in
[13] can be modified to consider the impact caused by the
jamming, both in the circuits that are under attack and in the
circuits allocated outside the jammed area.
This paper presents a performance evaluation for a control
plane aware of jamming attacks. Through signal processing
at the circuit destination node, the control panel is informed
about the presence of circuits with power affected by the
jamming attack. With this information, the control plane
prevents the occurrence of circuits that are targets of jamming,
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preventing the propagation of the effect in other circuits of the
network. The evaluation of the control plane with jamming
avoidance is made in comparison with a control plane unaware
of jamming attacks, under different scenarios of jamming
attacks. The results show that avoiding the establishment of
attacked circuits in some cases can generate performance
similar to scenarios without attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
shows the proposed jamming model for EON. Section III
shows the proposed jamming avoidance model scheme. Sec-
tion IV presents the performance evaluation for the proposed
model. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V.
II. JAMMING-AWARE PHYSICAL LAYER MODEL IN EON
We adopt the physical layer model proposed in [14], where
jamming attacks are embedded in the SNR equation [13]. We
model the network infrastructure as a graph G = (V,E).
The set of nodes is represented by V , and consists of routing
devices, and transceivers., and the set of optical links by E. An
optical link contains is a set of connected fiber spans, such that
each span is an optical fiber followed by an erbium-doped fiber
amplifier (EDFA). A link is able to transmit M slots. We define
the center frequency fm, the bandwidth ∆fm, and the power
Pm, for each channel m = 1, ...,M . We consider a network
that can support an large number of connections established
between different nodes and following a predefined route. A
connection i can be associated to a route ri, where ri is a
set of links starting from the source node and ending by the
destination node of connection i.
A jammer J can insert a high power signal in one or
more channels in order to disrupt the service. We denote by
MJ ⊂ M the set of jammed channels. We assume that the
power of J is PJ = P + , where P is the power of the rest
of channels, and  is the additional power.
The jamming attack aware SNR equation associated to a
connection i using a route ri is expressed as follows:
SNRm =
Gm
GASE +GNLI,s +GJ
(1)
Where Gm is the signal power spectral density (PSD) of
connection i using a channel m, GASE is the PSD of the
amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) noise, GNLI,s is the
PSD of the noise from nonlinear impairments (NLI) in a
secure network, and GJ is the PSD of the noise from NLI
caused by jamming.
The PSD of connection i using a channel m is written as:
Gm =
Pm
∆m
(2)
Where Pm is the power corresponding to Gm, and ∆m denotes
the bandwidth and considered constant for all links in the
connection.
The PSD of ASE can be expressed as follows:
GASE =
∑
l∈ri
NlG
ASE
0 , G
ASE
0 = (e
αL − 1)Fhν (3)
Where Nl is the number of spans on link l, L is the length of
each span, α is the power attenuation, F is the spontaneous
emission factor, h is Plancks constant, and ν is the light
frequency.
The PSD of the noise from NLI in a secure network:
GNLI,s =
∑
l∈ri
NlG
NLI,s
l (4)
with,
GNLI,sl (fm) = φGm[G
2
marcsinh(ρ(∆fm)
2)
+
M∑
m′=1
m′ 6=m
G2m′ ln(
fm,m′ + ∆fm′/2
fm,m′ −∆fm′/2)] (5)
and,
φ =
3γ2
2piα|β2| , ρ =
pi2|β2|
2α
(6)
Where fm is the center frequency of channel m. m′ is another
connection using link l, ∆fm′ is the bandwidths for connection
m′, fm,m′ = |fm − fm′ | is the center frequency spacing
between connections m and m′, γ is the fiber nonlinearity
coefficient, and β2 is the fiber dispersion.
And the PSD of the NLI caused by jamming:
GJ =
∑
l∈ri
NlG
J
l (7)
with,
GJl (fm) = φGm
2 + 2P
∆2m
∑
m′∈MJ
m′ 6=m
ln(
fm,m′ + ∆fm′/2
fm,m′ −∆fm′/2) (8)
To ensure and maintain the QoT of connections, the control
plane check if the value of SNR is higher than an SNR
threshold according to the standard provided by the Service
Level Agreement (SLA). Any connection with a SNR below
the SNR threshold is not accepted.
III. JAMMING DETECTION AND AVOIDANCE
The overall architecture of the studied control plane is
shown in Fig. 2. All the information about the state of the
network are sent to the Physical Topology Module.
The RSA Module finds the allocation solution based on the
information provided by thePhysical Topology Module. After
that, the solution is evaluated by the QoT Evaluation module.
The SNR estimation, as its name says measures the SNR value
based on the route information. The obtained evaluations are
sent to the Security Module, which is responsible on ensuring
the network security.
The control plane architecture is a key element to take
advantage of many capabilities of an EON. In [1], the authors
consider the use of an interface, called TAPI [15], which
creates abstractions of some network functionalities. Among
them is mentioned the ability to obtain information about
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Fig. 2. Overall architecture of the optical network control plane.
physical impairments inside the network links to physical
impairment computation models [1]. With this information,
it is possible to propose a control plane aware of the jamming
occurrence. In this study, a control plane model that prevents
the creation of jammed circuits is evaluated. The goal is to
verify the reduction of the jamming impact, mainly in the
circuits that suffer from out-of-band attacks. Figure 3 shows
the flowchart for answering or blocking calls operated by the
control plane.
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Fig. 3. Flowchart for the control plane evaluation.
In the first step, the incoming circuit request is evaluated
by the RSA algorithm, which is an extension of the control
plane and can be any RSA algorithm found in the literature that
suits the scenario. The RSA assesses the source and destination
node pair to define resources available for the new circuit. The
circuit request is blocked if no resources are found. Otherwise,
the selected resources are informed to the control plane.
The control plane evaluates the selected solution and decides
if the resources attend some quality restrictions. The control
plane verifies: if the selected route respects the distance
threshold allowed by the selected modulation level, if the
nodes have enough transmitters and receivers for the new
circuit, if the signal has acceptable noise power (in case of
physical-impairment evaluation) and other measurements.
In this jamming-aware control plane proposal, the control
plane uses the TAPI interface [1] to measure the power of
new circuits and compare it with the estimated power for that
circuit, besides performing the quality evaluations mentioned
previously. The SNR equation [13] is used to estimate the
power, and the circuit setting is the input. If any difference is
found between the measured power and the estimated power,
the control plane assumes that the circuit is crossing a jammed
channel, and demands another set of spectral resources to the
RSA algorithm. If no new resources are found, the request is
blocked.
This proposed control plane model avoids the occurrence
of in-band jamming, as no circuit is established inside the
jammed channel. Furthermore, the out-of-band jamming in-
tensity is reduced, and the only jamming interference is
descendant from the empty jammed channel. The next section
presents a performance evaluation from the jamming-aware
control plane proposal, compared to the unaware control plane.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we analyze the performance of the proposed
jamming-aware control plane on online network scenarios. In
the simulation, the jamming is launched in three fixed slot
ranges (50 to 59, 140 to 149 and 230 to 239), inside the 320
slot range. The reason of fixing the position of the attacker is to
study the impact of in-band jamming on the chosen slots, and
out-of-band jamming along the neighboring slots by looking
to slots utilization. The effect of jamming can be propagated
to other links through the circuits that cross the jammed slots
in the attacked link.
Two different scenarios are evaluated separately, and the
jamming is applied in different links. In the first scenario, the
attack occurs in the most used link. For the second scenario,
the jamming is applied in the least used link. Simulations are
performed previously, all with the same RSA algorithm, to
measure the link utilization in terms of spectral reserves. Thus,
the most used link is the one with highest average utilization in
the whole simulation, and the least used is the link with lowest
average utilization. The purpose is to evaluate the difference
of impact in two different link profiles. Figure 4 shows the
topology used in the simulations, the distance of each link in
km, and the most (in red) and least (in green) used links.
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Fig. 4. NSFNet topology, with the jammed link in red (links length in km).
Simulations are made with ONS simulator [16]. In both
scenarios, we consider links with 320 slots for each direction.
All scenarios are evaluated under a fixed load of 200 Erlangs,
and the results are the average of 10 replications, with 100,000
circuit requests each, following a Poisson distribution with
mean holding time of 600 seconds, with negative exponential
distribution and uniformly-distributed among all nodes-pairs.
We use 3 different values of bandwidth: 40, 200 and 400 Gbps,
uniformly selected. To solve the routing and spectrum assign-
ment (RSA) problem, we adopt the basic Dijkstra algorithm
for routing, and the First Fit policy for slot assignment. The
guardband between two adjacent lightpaths is assumed to be
2 slots. The circuits may use any of the modulation levels:
BPSQ, QPSK, 8QAM, 16QAM, 32QAM and 64QAM, with
SNRth equals to 9, 9, 12, 15, 18 and 21 respectively [17]. The
parameters for the SNR calculation are shown in table I [17]:
TABLE I
PARAMETERS FOR SNR CALCULATION.
Variable Value
PTX 0 dB
∆f 12.5 GHz
α 0.2 dB/km
L 100
γ 1.22Wkm−1
β2 16ps2/km
v 1.93× 1014Hz
F 6 dB
The jamming power  varies from 0 to 5 dB, in a step
of 0.5 dB. Higher values of  (beyond 5 dB) are not much
common in the EON jamming literature. Three different
evaluations are performed. First, is assessed the blocking
probability for i) scenarios without jamming, ii) scenario
with jamming attacks and unaware of it, and iii) scenario
with jamming attack and a jamming-aware control plane.
These evaluations are conducted for the jamming attack in
the most used and the least used link. The second evaluation
is also blocking probability, but performed in a smaller step
of jamming variation (0.25 instead of 0.5), to show details in
the range with high jamming impact. This comparison shows
how different can be the impact in the network, depending
on the attacked link. The third evaluation demonstrates the
average slot utilization in the most used link, to clarify how
different jamming approaches can affect the spectrum. Figure
5 presents the blocking probability for jamming attack in the
most used (a) and least used (b) links.
To represent two different scenarios, the following notation
is used: MU is a reference to the most used link and LU is
the least used link. For the jamming occurrences, the J is used
to represent the scenario under jamming attack and unaware
of it, and the JA represents the jamming-aware control plane
scenario. These representations are combined, like MU −JA
is used to represent the jamming-aware control plane in the
scenario where the attack occurs in the most used link.
The blocking probability for the not-jammed scenario is
constant in (a) and (b), and the x axis represents the jamming
power variation  in the other scenarios. For the MU −J sce-
nario, the impact of small  is indistinguishable, and the small
increase of power almost do not impair the active circuits.
However, as the jamming power increases, the blocking grows
until reach the first peak, between scenarios of  equals to 2
and 3 dB. In this peak is found the highest number of circuits
under in-jamming attack. These are the circuits allocated inside
the jammed channel. At this point, there are a lot of jammed
circuits with SNR near the threshold, and these circuits prevent
the allocation of new circuits.
For highest values (  greater than 3 dB), the creation of cir-
cuits inside the jammed channel is reduced. It occurs because
the high power affects the SNR of jammed circuits spectrally
close to each other, and the control plane do not allow the
creation of circuits with SNR below the chosen modulation
threshold, even in the unaware of jamming scenario. Thus, for
higher values of , the in-band jamming is reduced (as less
circuits are created inside the jammed channel), and the out-
of-band jamming grows, as the empty jammed channel still
interferes in spectrally near circuits.
In the MU − JA scenario, the blocking probability is
slightly increased for low  values. It occurs because some
slots are avoided, even if the jamming interference is very low.
The jammed channel is kept empty, and it keeps the blocking
probability in a constant behavior until values of  near 3.5 dB.
After this point, the out-of-band effect of the empty jammed
channel is similar to MU − J scenario, and the out-of-band
effect in both scenarios is inevitable.
For the simulations of Fig.5(b), the difference between the
LU − J , LU − JA and no jamming scenarios is almost
negligible. This means that the jamming effect in a link with
low usage has a small interference in the whole network
performance. Figure 6 shows the blocking probability with
a smaller  variation in the first blocking peak.
The results in Fig. 6 allows to perceive the different impacts
of jamming attack in MU and LU links. In LU scenario, even
the worst case LU−J has performance similar to the scenario
without jamming. The MU − J scenario achieves the worst
blocking. In this  range, with most intense in-band jamming,
the jamming-aware control plane performs better, because it
keeps the jammed channel empty and avoids the creation of
in-band jammed circuits, which would spread the out-of-band
jamming. It is found that the peak occurs to  near 2.25 dB.
To demonstrate the behavior of circuits inside the optical
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(a) Blocking probability without jamming avoidance.
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(b) Blocking probability with jamming avoidance.
Fig. 5. Blocking probability for jamming attacks in the most used (a) and least used (b) links.
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Fig. 6. Blocking probability for jamming attacks in the most used (a) and
least used (b) links, with zoom for the highest jamming impact.
spectrum, Figure 7 shows the average spectral utilization of
all links in the network in MU scenario.
For the MU − J with 0 dB (equivalent to no jamming
scenario), the slot utilization slowly decreases as the slot index
increases. This behavior is a consequence of First Fit allocation
policy, in which slots are allocated from the first index to the
last. For the other scenarios, some gaps are included, and this
can occur in two cases: as a consequence of an increasing
in-band jamming, which decreases the slot utilization in the
jammed channel when  increases (MU−J 2.25dB and MU−
J 5 dB cases); or as a consequence of jamming avoidance by
the control plane, when the jammed slots are always free and
avoided by the control plane (in MU −JA 0.0dB, MU −JA
2.25 dB and MU − JA 5 dB cases).
The presented results shows that the link selected by the
attacker plays an important role in the attack intensity. Fur-
thermore, the jamming power  may be adjusted to a value
not so high and still can cause great impact in the network.
These results open some research opportunities, like the study
of different jamming strategies, variations in size of jammed
channel and the application of the jamming model in other
types of optical networks.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyzed jamming power attacks in elastic
optical networks, by embedding the insertion of jamming
power into the physical layer model. We proposed an architec-
ture of a jamming aware control plane. Then, we studied the
impact of in-band and out-of-band jamming on the blocking
probability and slots utilization into two different scenarios,
considering the jamming occurrence in the most used and the
least used link.
As a future work, we plan to incorporate techniques of
jamming detection in the proposed security module, to provide
a precise information about the jammer position, as well as
proposing accurate prevention mechanism.
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